INTRODUCTION
Corruption is largely regarded as a pernicious activity, for breaching procedural justice, for distorting political decisions and for generating various undesirable outcomes, such as lower economic growth. 1 One common concern is that corruption favors the rich and powerful. Conversely, judicial accountability (a prime aspect of institutional quality) is often seen not only as an antidote to corruption but also as something valuable per se, although the focus is rarely on the distributional consequences. 2 When corruption is present, and when judicial accountability is compromised, one may talk of "unfair procedures" in public governance. In this study, we aim to analyze how these unfair procedures, whereby people gain influence over policy, legislation and their implementation in violation of the general system of rules, relate to income and consumption inequality. Who benefits and who is made worse thereby?
We follow Bergh et al. (2016, p. 39) by regarding corruption as "the abuse of authority in which politicians and officials exploit their official position to engage in 1 On the generally negative relation between corruption and economic growth, see, e.g., Aidt (2009) and Pellegrini (2011a) . However, Méon and Weill (2010) find that in settings with very poor institutions, corruption can be efficiency-enhancing.
3 favoritism, thereby contravening the norm of impartiality in the exercise of authority to obtain direct or indirect personal gain for themselves or persons close to them." 3 Such favoritism typically presupposes the existence of another party who enters into some sort of exchange with the public officialit might, for example, be a contractor who offers a politician a house or a payment, now or laterif the politician ensures that the contractor obtains a lucrative contract with the government in violation of procedural rules. Corruption can also occur in the legal sphereand we study it by focusing on judicial accountability.
When this feature of legal institutions is in place, judges who engage in serious misconduct are either fired or disciplined. We interpret its absence as implying corrupt practices that allow judges to circumvent the rules, such as the ones requiring them to conscientiously implement and enforce government legislation.
As Klitgaard (1988) originally emphasized, corruption is the outcome of monopoly plus discretion minus accountability. Indeed, this is why political institutionsnot least democracy as such as well as various features of democracy, such as press freedom, free and recurring elections and a division of powermay help stifle corrupt behavior (Aidt, 2003). 4 They may also affect what the consequences of corruption look like, given that corruption occurs, by contributing to shaping which policies are instituted. One such consequence concerns the distribution and use of resources.
This insight is captured in our theoretical framework, which links political institutions (which give de jure power) and resources (which give de facto power and can be used for corruption) to the design of economic institutions and policies, as well as legal institutions and practices, that in turn shape economic outcomes and the distribution of resources (which is shaped both by the workings of the economic process and by redistribution). The political institutions and their stability determine not only who has formal political power but also influence how those with resources and actual political power are able to use those resources to try to influence the decisions taken (Olson, 1982) . One might assume that people with resources and an openness to corruption will try to have the economic institutions and policies formed such that they get more resources, and if the richest people are most active here, this suggests that corruption is linked to more inequality.
4 Yet, we emphasize that this need not be the case: It could be that those people realize that they cannot push through economic institutions and policies that primarily benefit them, due to the risk of social turmoil; or they can have an altruistic streak, so as to act to benefit others out of concern for their welfare; or it could be that people other than the richest are more successful, at times, in getting favors (e.g., on the local level, with much personal interaction between people in general and public officials). In these latter cases, more corruption could entail less inequality. By interacting the stability of political institutions with corruption, one can also investigate how this effect variesthe Olsonian idea of institutional sclerosis implies that stability can give greater options for corrupt people to influence decisions in line with their preferences. Hence, one would expect the relationship between corruption and inequality to become stronger, in whatever direction, with more political stability.
In our empirical analysis, we use the measures of corruption and judicial accountability of the V-Dem project to study consequences for inequality, as it offers the longest time series available for a large number of countries (Coppedge et al., 2017) . Our dependent variables are income and consumption inequality, which are measured both as income/consumption shares per quintile and as Gini and Theil coefficients from the Göttingen Consumption and Income Project (GCIP, 2018) . The two inequality measures are related in the sense that net income puts a limit on absolute consumption: those with small incomes cannot spend all that much. But consumption patterns are also a matter of preference (of how much to save and how much to consume out of the net income one gets), which indicates that some people with high incomes may spend quite little, especially in relation to their income, if they for example have a thrifty side to them or perceive a need to maintain a buffer or level of insurance as a response to substantial uncertainty. Meyer and Sullivan (2017) argue that consumption inequality is a useful complement measure because it often provides a more accurate picture of economic well-being than income. 5 The results indicate that corruption is negatively related to both gross-income and consumption inequality, while judicial accountability is positively related to such distributional outcomes. More specifically, the more corruption there is, the higher is the income and consumption of the bottom quintile, and the more accountable the de facto 5 Comparisons of trends in income and consumption inequality tend to find that the latter has not increased as much and is lower: see, e.g., Meyer and Sullivan (2017) for the United States, Brzozowski et al. (2010) for Canada and Jappelli and Pistaferri (2010) for Italy. 5 procedures of the judicial institutions are, the higher is the income and consumption of the top quintile. These results are confirmed, in the case of consumption inequality, when using Gini and Theil coefficients instead of quintiles.
Our findings suggest that in spite of what popular perceptions might be, corruption does not necessarily benefit the economic elites, and investing in judicial accountability may in fact skew the income distribution. Rather, the findings are compatible with the replacement-theory prediction that elites will allow others to benefit when they fear that their power will otherwise risk being eroded (which is plausibly the case in highly corrupt societies). It is also compatible with the elites having an altruistic streak; with non-elites being more successful at using corruption to their advantage than elites; and with the notion that market outcomes may simply turn out to benefit the non-elites, irrespective of what the corrupt instigators had aimed at accomplishing.
We control for political institutions, since they have been shown to affect corruption and can be expected to affect the distributions of income and consumption as well.
Importantly, we perform an analysis where corruption and judicial accountability are interacted with the stability of political institutions, thereby testing a version of Mancur Olson's institutional sclerosis thesis. We find that the associations between corruption and income inequality, and between judicial accountability and income inequality, are similar over the stability of political institutions, while consumption inequality is reduced the longer such institutions have been firmly in place, suggesting that those that benefit from corruption (the four lower consumption quintiles) and judicial accountability (the top quintile) are even better able to extract favors the more stable the institutional landscape. We can, nevertheless, only claim that the increase in the associations over time is causal.
As indicated by our theoretical approach, the relationship between corruption and inequality could be either of a positive or a negative kind. Hence, it is not surprising that the existing literature contains findings of both kinds. Some previous studies have, like us, found a negative relationship, but primarily for Latin America (Dobson and Ramlogan-Dobson, 2010; Andres and Ramlogan-Dobson, 2011) . We are the first to identify a negative relationship for a broad cross-country sample. However, there are also studies indicating a positive relationship. Gupta et al. (2002) identify such a relationship, for some 38 countries over the period 1980 -1997 . Gyimah-Brempong (2002 likewise finds a positive relationship for Africa. Relatedly, Bjørnskov and Justesen (2014) uncover, also for an African sample, that the poor are obliged to pay bribes to officials to a larger extent than others (note that this could be seen as compatible with corruption benefitting the poor more than others).
6
What we add to the existing literature is a new, open-ended theoretical framework; a much more comprehensive dataset -we look at 145 countries over the period 1960-2014 and thus capture both a much more diverse group of countries and a much longer time period than any previous study; and we control for political institutions and interact their stability with corruption.
This study matters in at least two ways. First, it brings new knowledge to bear on the important issue of what the consequences of corruption and judicial accountability are. If one dislikes inequality, our study suggests that corruption may not only have negative effects, and that judicial accountability may entail negative effects, which suggests that combatting corruption and strengthening judicial accountability may have unintended consequences.
Second, it furthermore sheds new light on what determines income and consumption
inequality, not only showing that corruption and judicial quality are important explanatory factors but also that political institutionsand not least their stabilitymatter. This should provide useful insights for those working in policy areas where corruption is present.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK (a) The overall framework
Our theoretical framework is inspired by the model relating political institutions, resources and power to economic institutions and outcomes in Acemoglu et al. (2005) and is illustrated in Figure 1 . Our ultimate variables of interest concern the distribution of resources (in our case income) and the distribution of their usage (in our case consumption). What determines such distributions? In our framework, this outcome, as well as other economic outcomes (such as GDP growth rates), are shaped by the economic institutions and policies in place. By economic institutions we mean the generally stable framework of legal rules that ideally define and uphold private property rights and other aspects of formalized economic life, such as the protection of contracts and the enforcement of rules against theft, fraud etc.
By economic policies we mean the typically more transient set of political decisions that concern specific aspects of economic lifesuch as taxes, regulation, subsidies and transfers (cf. Williamson, 2010) .
Insert Figure 1 about here
Economic institutions affect economic outcomes by providing predictability in economic exchange (North, 1990) . Economic actors know that it is very likely that people will behave well and be trustworthy if the legal system is considered fair and effective, and if actors within it can be held accountable, which stimulates economic exchange; and they will have an incentive to engage in productive and innovative activities if they can be reasonably certain that their belongings will not be taken away from them (especially not in an arbitrary manner). Economic policies likewise affect economic outcomes by affecting the incentive structure through the way it changes the relative payoffs of different activities. For example, if government is large and has introduced very high and progressive marginal tax rates as well as wasteful expenditure programs, this is likely to stifle productive activities and stimulate unproductive ones, with negative growth effects (Bergh and Henrekson, 2011; Bjørnskov and Foss, 2016) .
In our case, we are primarily concerned with the distribution of resources and their usage. Whatever resources are produced in an economy will belong to different people, and they will be used to whatever ends their owners prioritize. Both institutions and policies influence the overall distribution of, e.g., income, wealth and consumption. Institutions do so by upholding the formal structure of the rule of law, which allows the market-economic process to operate, with "spontaneous" distributional outcomes (for gross values). Policies do so more directly by affecting what economic activities are undertaken, how they are undertaken and to what extent they are undertaken (all of which affects the distribution of gross values) and through redistribution (which in addition affects net values). 6 How the net incomes are used is then a matter of personal preference: Some part will be used for consumption, another for saving, etc., with resulting inequalities in these variables.
We are getting closer to the role of corruption and judicial accountability by asking:
What, in turn, determines economic institutions and policies? The answer is powerof two kinds. On the one hand, there are those who make political decisions, including legislative ones, in accordance with the political institutions. There is almost always a constitution that specifies these rules of the political game: How the head of state is appointed, how the head of government is selected, how the legislature is organized and how the legislators are 6 For an analysis of how institutions and policies affect income inequality through the market process and through redistribution, see Berggren (1999). 8 elected, what the role of judicial review is, etc. People who hold office in accordance with these formal rules execute what can be called de jure power: power assigned to them by dint of their having a formal position that comes with an authority to act in certain (but not other) ways. Thus, they are typically able to change economic institutions and policies if they follow the procedural criteria laid out by the rules.
On the other hand, there are those who have de facto power. Such power comes with resources, and it may be executed in various ways. For example, people may use the media to sway public opinion; they may instigate demonstrations and even revolts; and they maywhich is what primarily interests us hereengage in rent-seeking and use corruption to achieve their goals (Congleton and Hillman, 2015) . Clearly, then, resources can bring de facto political power through actions that influence those with de jure political power, such that they devise economic institutions and policies in a manner that is in line with the preferences of those with resources, one instance of which is corruption in the form of "grand corruption" or "state capture" (Aidt, 2003; Knack, 2007) . Resources are offered to a politician, bureaucrat or jurist, in exchange for some reform of institutions or policies or some promise not to enforce existing rules as they pertain to some activity. 7 Yet, for any given set of legislation and regulation, corruption can also affect the actual implementation of de jure decisions when such decisions create a sufficient incentive to avoid regulations (Aidt, 2003) . Contrary to state capturei.e., when corruption and lobbying affects policy decisions -"petty" corruption can undermine the effectiveness of such policies when firms and individuals can bribe their way around them. As stressed by Bjørnskov (2011) , this can under some conditions imply that economic activity, which would otherwise be subject to regulations, goes entirely unregistered and thus does not appear in official income statistics.
Lastly, there is a third set of institutions, the quality of which is of importance: judicial institutions. We take these to be approximately exogenous to the daily political process, and as such, they are able to influence decision-making through two avenues. First, 7 The degree to which corruption is used depends on many thingssee, e.g., Aidt (2003) and Pellegrini (2011b) not least on the political institutions themselves (as mentioned in the Introduction), with transparency, accountability and division of power as antidotes. One way to see it is as a trade-off on the margin for politicians, following Peltzman (1976), where satisfying voters is one method to reach the goal of de jure political power but where satisfying interest groups, possibly through corruption, is another, generally disliked by voters if they find out about it. Hence the tradeoff, with less corruption the easier it is for voters to find out about it. the quality of the judicial institutions affects the scope of corruption (which is denoted by the arrow in Figure 1 showing an effect on the execution of de facto power). Second, this quality also constrains the design of economic institutions and policies, towards generality (Buchanan and Congleton, 1998) . However, the legal system itself is not immune to corruption, which is where judicial accountability comes in. Corruption may be used to influence legal practitioners in various ways, such that the enforcement of rules is becoming laxer; and legal practitioners, such as judges, can themselves engage in corrupt practices so as to circumvent the rules and behave in ways that benefit them without being disciplined for it.
Hence the arrow from de facto power to judicial institutions. As noted, the arrow from judicial institutions to economic institutions and policies denotes the importance of legal institutions for what economic decisions that are takenbut the generality that they should ideally uphold in economic decision-making may be undermined if corruption has reduced judicial accountability (taking away the constraining function of the legal system). This leaves room for special interests (some of whom can be judges).
Against this schematic background, the main question of interest to us is what the effect of corruption in politics and the judiciary in the end is on income and consumption inequality, i.e., how the influence that comes with transfers of benefits to those with de jure power translates into income and consumption effects over the whole distributions.
(b) Corruption, judicial accountability and income inequality
Starting with income inequality, one needs to distinguish between gross and net income. In the former case, the distribution is the result of market outcomes (in turn shaped by individual preferences and the incentives provided by economic institutions and policies), while in the latter case it is also the result of taxes and transfers, i.e., redistribution. If corruption increases (decreases) gross-income inequality this is because economic institutions and policies (other than redistribution) have changed or been circumvented as the result of the corruption, such that groups with higher (lower) incomes have benefitted more than others in the market process. If corruption increases (decreases) net-income inequality this is either because economic institutions and policies (other than redistribution) have changed or been circumvented as the result of the corruption, such that groups with higher (lower) incomes have benefitted more than others in the market process; or because those involved in corruption have been favored more than others by changes to the redistributive system. This implies either that those groups who benefitted more were more effective at using corruption, or that those who were most effective at using corruption, if not those who benefitted more, (consciously or unconsciously) helped others benefit more than themselves.
This reasoning can be connected to two theoretical contributions with more precise predictions. First, Alesina and Angeletos (2005) model a setting where corruption is used and widely regarded as unjust, which leads to demands for and policies that entail more redistribution. This is one mechanism that could explain why corruption results in lower netincome inequality: policymakers are corrupt but also sensitive to popular sentiments and therefore willing to appease the voters. Second, Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) model a "replacement effect", where political leaders block institutional, technological and economic progress since they fear being replaced by others who would benefit from it and challenge their political power. In our case, a similar logic could be applied. In a setting where corruption is high it could be that elites perceive they are in a contested situation where others can overtake their influence by pooling resourcesunless they ensure that the non-elites benefit and feel reasonably content. Thus, they can give up certain gains from corruption, and perhaps even accept some financial losses, if this solidifies their de facto political power over the long term.
With regard to judicial accountability and income inequality, we propose two links.
First, low judicial accountability implies corruption in the judicial sphere as well as the absence of protection against corruption in the political sphere, and hence that corruption is more prevalent. This allows for a link between corruption and income inequality, as sketched out above in this section. To the extent that low judicial accountability is an indicator of judicial institutions functioning poorly or lacking entirely, it could furthermore entail a disadvantageous situation for the worst-off in society, e.g., if the de facto property of poor people is not protected by anything but force, preventing the relatively poor from investing and bettering themselves (de Soto, 1989) . Second, high judicial accountability indicates the absence of corruption among judges and a potentially effective constraint on corruption elsewhere in the public sector. In this case, there is a link to income inequality in the sense that whatever the economic institutions and policies are, they are upheld by the legal system.
Whether the economic institutions and policies give rise to high or low inequality, this effect is strengthened by the presence of judicial accountability. In other words, judicial accountability helps the state to enforce legislation and policies of any kind, including policies with substantial costs to some or all groups in society. As stressed by Voigt (2013) , the full effects of good judicial institutions rest on the quality of the actual legislation, which implies that such institutions can contribute to upholding economic outcomes that are considered undesirable by many. Corruption that worsen aspects of judicial quality, such as judicial accountability, might then undermine such outcomes. For example, it thus remains an option that good judicial institutions, with high accountability, may "fossilize" the distribution of property if the country lacks well-functioning market institutions within which citizens can also freely trade and transfer property.
(c) Corruption and consumption inequality
Let us next consider consumption inequality. Consumption is a function of available resources and personal preferences. Hence, consumption inequality is arguably directly related to net-income inequality: People who have low net incomes cannot consume very much in absolute terms, and vice versa. (Still, the share of income going to consumption tends to be higher for low-income earners since life's necessities "have to" be consumed by everyone.) But consumption is also related to the relative preference for consumption and savingeven if one has a high net income, one may wish to save a larger share than those who have lower income (which also seems to be the case; see Dynan et al., 2004) . This option points at a possibility that consumption inequality is lower than net-income inequality, which is also confirmed in empirical studies for several countries (see note 4 above).
In any case, the issue here is one of linking corruption to consumption inequality. The reasoning is basically the same as that for net-income inequality: The factors that affect that outcome variable are likely to affect consumption inequality as well, although imperfectly.
What needs to be added, we suggest, are three potential links between corruption and consumption inequality that adds more precise predictions about the relationship: 1) the choice between consuming and saving due to the effects of corruption on taxation and the influence of both corruption and judicial accountability on the ability to circumvent taxes and financial regulations; 2) the effects of gaining access to goods brought illegally into the country, i.e., when corrupt practices are used to circumvent external barriers in the form of tariffs and non-tariff trade barriers or when they are not enforced by a non-accountable judicial system; and 3) the overall effects of corruption on the price structure when corrupt activities enable individuals to circumvent internal barriers such as price controls and other domestic regulation.
With respect to the first mechanism, one factor of importance is taxation, particularly capital taxes and consumption taxes. How a given net income is divided is partly determined by post-tax variables: the higher the capital taxes and the lower the consumption taxes, the larger a share people can be expected to consume out of their budget. Corruption and judicial quality can affect both the formal properties of the tax system but also how easy it is to circumvent the rules. While people strong in resources can probably exercise more power visà-vis the political decision-makers and bureaucrats, it remains possible that people with less resources can be more skillful, e.g., through small businesses, to evade the taxes in place.
Corruption may therefore lead to tax evasion from both the relatively rich and the relatively poor, although we note that evasion through operating in the underground economy is a more likely strategy for the poor (Bjørnskov, 2011). 8 Another factor regarding the choice of whether to save and consume in relation to corruption is safety in saving, which has to do with legal institutions and their enforcement. If people suspect that savings may be confiscated or not protected well, they will tend to consume relatively more. This perception of safety can differ between consumption groupsnot least in highly corrupt societies (Sonin, 2003) . There, one would expect that it is easier for people with substantial resources to protect their savings than for people with few resources.
With regard to the second mechanism, corruption may affect the price structure in a pro-poor direction by enabling increased international trade. When, for example, prices on certain goods are higher than in neighboring countries, petty corruption at the border will enable smuggling. As price differences on bulk goods can be sizeable due to trade barriers (cf. Golub and Mbaye, 2009), corruption therefore effectively reduces the prices that people pay on ordinary goods (Schwarz, 2012) . As such goods constitute a substantial share of the total consumption basket of poor people, these price changes allow a larger consumption increase among poorer segments of society and will thereby be associated with a decrease in consumption inequality.
As for the third mechanism, policies that for example imply price controls will have similar effects as trade barriers. While Brazil and Chile implemented very similar price controls in the early 1970s, they had different economic consequences. As bureaucrats supposed to enforce the price controls could be easily bribed in Brazil but not in Chile, the 13 controls had strongly adverse consequences for the Chilean poor but not those in Brazil (Leff and Heidenheimer, 2017) . Actual consumption inequality therefore increased in Chile while the intended effects were offset by corruption in Brazil. 9 Similar effects may also pertain when corruption, at times due to low judicial accountability, allows individuals and other firms to circumvent domestic regulation that create or enforce monopolies (Stigler, 1970) .
(d) Corruption, judicial accountability and inequality: Expected signs
Will, then, gross-income inequality, net-income inequality and consumption inequality rise or fall as a result of corruption? Many might think it unambiguously clear that each measure will rise. But our theoretical framework paints a more nuanced and complex picturecertainly allowing for such an outcome but not necessarily implying it. It all depends on how people with de facto power use their power and how they can use it, which is in turn largely determined by political institutions and their stability. This will shape economic institutions and policies in certain ways, which contribute to determining both income inequality and consumption inequality. Those with much resources can try to influence the process in their favor through corrupt means; but they could also benefit others by instigating market processes that (intentionally or unintentionally) shape the gross-income distribution in ways that favor people with small resources, by influencing the redistributive system (intentionally or unintentionally) such that the net-income distribution becomes more equal and also by influencing the factors that determine whether to save or consume (intentionally or unintentionally) in such a manner that those with small budgets fare better.
These outcomes in favor of other groups could be accidental or motivated by altruistic concerns or by insights that "too much inequality" is bad, in the long-term, for overall social cohesion and the society in which they live and, according to the replacement-effect logic, for their own power base. In addition, it should not be ruled out that groups with small resources can sometimes be successful in influencing political decision-makers as wellmaybe by contributing their votes and time to the politicians, but also, especially in local settings, by bribing officials to the benefit of, typically, small businesses. 9 Also see Bergh and Nilsson (2014) for a related finding. They show that the poor can benefit from price changes induced by higher income inequality. The idea is that more poor consumers lead to cheap products becoming more profitable and hence more supplied. They confirm a negative relation between income inequality and the price of inferior goods.
Next, what might the sign of the effect of judicial accountability on our inequality measures be? As we clarified in the preceding section, the links are of at least two kinds.
First, if judicial accountability is low we basically have a setting with corruption, and the reasoning concerning how corruption affects the inequalities under consideration applies.
Second, if judicial accountability is high, we have a situation which arguably is characterized by low corruption, but the judicial institutions solidify whatever economic institutions and policies that are decided upon, with their respective distributional consequences. Hence, while we can delineate these "structural" links, on the basis of theory, the sign could be either positive or negative.
(e) The role of the stability of political institutions
Lastly, whatever the effect of corruption and judicial accountability on inequality, we propose that the stability of political institutions can influence the effects in such a way as to strengthen them. This proposition stems from Olson (1982) and his idea of institutional sclerosis, suggesting that sets of rules that are in place over long periods of time allow for interest groups or corrupting agents to better develop and sustain their activities vis-à-vis the political decision-makers. Institutional stability for example lowers the costs associated with rent-seeking, as agents form stable relationships and modes of operation form, and special interests capture regulatory agencies (Stigler, 1970) . Hence, when considering a potential moderating effect, we expect a reinforcement: Those that are favored by corruption (in the distribution of income or consumption) are even more favored the more stable the political institutions are. Olson's theory of institutional sclerosis therefore also implies that the consequences of corruption will be increasing in regime stability and most severe in societies with strongly entrenched institutions.
THE DATA AND EMPIRICAL APPROACH
The data we use cover 145 countries from all over the world for the period 1960-2014 for which we have data on corruption, judicial accountability and the income distribution. Our dependent variables are income and consumption inequality, primarily measured as the shares of total (wage as well as non-wage) incomes obtained per quintile and as the share of all consumption spent per quintile, but also measured, in a follow-up analysis, in the form of Gini coefficients and the Theil index (for a presentation of the latter, see Conceição and Ferreira, 2010) . The income inequality measures capture gross incomes (i.e., incomes before taxes and transfers), which implies that redistribution is ruled out as a mechanism through which corruption can affect the studied income distribution. The source is the Göttingen Consumption and Income Project (GCIP, 2018) , which provides both comprehensive coverage of multiple inequality measures as well as data on decile and quintile income shares.
Our main explanatory variables are corruption, judicial accountability, as well as political institutions and their stability. We derive our measure of corruption from the V-Dem dataset, where we also get a measure of de facto judicial accountability (Coppedge et al., 2017a) . The V-Dem corruption index is an aggregate of measures of six types of corruption in political and judicial institutions, distinguishing between bribery and embezzlement in executive, legislative and judicial processes. Its intention is to capture both "corruption aimed and influencing law making and that affecting implementation" (Coppedge et al., 2017a, p. 72 ). 10 The V-Dem corruption measure therefore conceptually captures the type of problems outlined in our theoretical considerations.
The judicial accountability index from V-Dem is constructed in the same way and intended to capture the likelihood that "judges [who] are found responsible for serious misconduct […] are […] removed from their posts or otherwise disciplined" (Coppedge et al., 2017a, p. 211) . One reason for adding this index is to alleviate a known problem in corruption research: that institutional quality could affect inequality in several other ways than corruption, not least through affecting the degree of protection of private property rights (e.g., Dong and Torgler, 2010 ). Yet, as judicial accountability is nevertheless associated with 10 For a full description of the V-Dem measurement methodology, see Coppedge et al. (2017b) . The V-Dem measure appears very similar to standard alternatives, and for example correlates at about 0.9 with the Transparency International (2018) Corruption Perceptions Index. Admittedly, this type of perceptions-based measure has faced critique, e.g., by Donchev and Ujhelyi (2014) , who claim that it is biased downwards and that large countries are penalized since it measures absolute corruption perceptions, and by Ko and Samajdar (2010) , who point out the risk of selection bias, longitudinal sensitivity and measurement errors. However, there are also defenders of the measure, most notably Kaufmann et al. (2007) and Uslaner (2017) . We tend to agree with the defenders. The measure is not without its imperfections, but it seems valid overall and better than available alternatives for a large cross-country sample such as ours. better control of corruption at all levels of society, it is therefore strongly (and negatively) correlated with corruption. Not controlling for a factor such as judicial accountability would therefore cause such effects to be captured by our measure of corruption, and vice versa, which would therefore lead to potentially biased estimates. While its inclusion therefore allows us to estimate effects of, e.g., protection of property rights, it also ensures us that we are capturing approximately the full effects of corruption, and no consequences of spuriously correlated factors. 11 We match these data to information on political institutions from Bjørnskov and Rode (2018) . These characteristics first include whether the country has a single-party system, is an electoral autocracyi.e. that it has a multi-party system but where elections are not free and fair and thus cannot lead to a change of governmentor if it is a full democracy; the baseline category is countries without elections. From the same source, we obtain information on whether or not the parliament is bicameral and whether elections are based on proportional voting or some form of first-past-the-post system. Finally, we capture the stability of political institutions through a measure counting how long ago a major change in political institutions occurred. We define such a change as either a successful coup, the implementation of a new or strongly amended constitution, or a peaceful regime transition. In our data, this latter category mainly consists of democratizations.
We follow the general literature on income inequality back to Kuznets (1955) by first adding the logarithm to real GDP per capita and its square. We also include the trade share of GDP, the share of government consumption, and the price level of capital relative to the US; the data are all from the Penn World Tables, mark 9 (Feenstra et al., 2015) . Finally, we add dummies for whether successful and failed coups occurred in a country; these data are from Bjørnskov and Rode (2018) . We summarize all data in Table 1 .
Insert Table 1 about here 11 Since corruption is causally affected by judicial accountability (Bjørnskov, 2011) , it is possible to imagine a mechanism in which judicial accountability affects corruption that in turn affects the distribution of income or consumption. By directly controlling for judicial accountability, we may underestimate the full effects of such mechanisms, and the estimated effects of corruption in the following can therefore best be thought of as lowerbound estimates of the full effect but correct unbiased estimates of the direct effects.
In the following, we estimate everything using OLS with two-way fixed effects. As such, the inclusion of year and country fixed effects takes care of all changes due either to common international trends and potential changes in measurement methodology as well as time-invariant country-specific factors. We note that we cannot fully establish causality in the relation between corruption, judicial accountability and inequality, as several mechanisms exist that could create reverse causality (e.g. Jong-sung and Khagram, 2005) . We therefore follow Nizalova and Murtazashvili (2016) in adding an interaction term between corruption and the (logarithm to) time since the last major institutional change. As long as the time since the last change is exogenous to corruption, which is strongly indicated by Figure A1 in the Appendix, causality can be directly inferable from the effect heterogeneity (the interaction term). In other words, even though we cannot claim that the association that we observe between corruption and inequality around regime transitions is causal in a particular direction, any additional effect that arises over time must be so. Apart from being able to establish causality under such conditions, we also emphasize that an increasing effect of corruption after regime change is not only fully consistent with Olson's (1982) theory of institutional sclerosis, but also a logical consequence of the mechanisms behind sclerosis. Our causal identification strategy is thus based on a particular theoretical expectation.
RESULTS
We begin by presenting the baseline findings in Tables 2 and 3, in the form of effects of corruption and judicial accountability, and other explanatory variables, on quintile shares of the distribution of income and consumption, respectively. In both tables, columns 1-5 report the results for the first to fifth quintile for the full sample, while columns 6-10 report results for a subsample where we exclude all observations from non-democracies.
Insert Table 2 about here
We first observe significant evidence of a Kuznets Curve, as GDP per capita exhibits a clear hump-shaped relation with inequality. In the full sample, the top point of the Kuznets Curve for the income distribution is approximately 4,000 USD for the first quintile and 6,000 USD for the fifth quintile, while the equivalent top points for the democratic subsample are 5,000 and 8,000 USD. The corresponding top points for the consumption distribution (in Table 3 ) are around 6,000 and 9,000 USD in the full sample and the democratic subsample, respectively. We also observe a more equal distribution of income associated with faster population growth. In addition, international trade is associated with more inequality as more trade can be linked to a concentration of income and consumption in the top quintile.
Moreover, while a larger size of government appears to be associated with a more equal distribution of income in Table 2 , it is associated with a less equal distribution of consumption in Table 3 . With respect to the last economic factor, investment prices, we find mixed evidence that it mainly affects the fourth quintile, i.e., what may be thought of as the income share of the upper middle class.
Insert Table 3 about here
Turning to the association of the inequality measures with political institutions, single-party regimes appear to be associated with a concentration of incomes in the top quintile. Yet, focusing on consumption, we find that all party-based regimes have more equal consumption distributions than countries without elections, and that full democracies on average exhibit the most equal consumption distribution. We also observe that bicameral regimes tend to have income distributions skewed, to the benefit of the top quintile, but consumption distributions that, if anything, are slightly skewed towards the fourth quintile.
Proportional voting systems are also in general associated with more skewed distributions of income and consumption, although the effects on consumption inequality are curiously driven entirely by the non-democratic observations. Yet, temporarily ridding a country of such institutions through a successful coup appears to equalize consumption opportunities in most countries. 12 Finally, turning to the main aim of this paper, we find throughout Tables 2 and 3 that stronger judicial accountability is associated with substantially larger top quintile shares, while political corruption is associated with smaller top quintile shares, and particularly so in democracies. Comparing the results for the distribution of income (in Table 2 ) and consumption (Table 3) , we also observe that these associations are significantly stronger for consumption than for income. Hence, what might be called unfair procedurescorruption and deviations from judicial accountabilityare related to distributional outcomes that are adverse to the economic elites and beneficial for the relatively worse-off! Yet, as noted in Section 3, we cannot claim that these associations are causal in a particular direction. In Table 4 , we therefore introduce an interaction with the logarithm to the time since a large institutional change occurred; we illustrate the heterogeneity in Figure   2 . The basis for this exercise, as outlined in Section 2, is Olson's (1982) Table 4 or subsequently prove to be fragile (see Tables A2 and A3 in the Appendix). Table 4 and the illustration in Figure 2 seem to show heterogeneity over time in the case of income, those results prove to be fragile in our ensuing regional jackknife analysis (see below), and for income we consequently cannot claim any causal evidence. However, the effects of corruption on the distribution of consumption are clearly increasing in the time since the last major institutional change. After about ten years, the estimate on the bottom quintile of the distribution of consumption is approximately .012calculated as the "pure" estimate plus the interaction term times the log to 10and significantly different from the estimate at time zero. We observe quite similar effects of 20 judicial accountability that do not appear heterogeneous for the distribution of income, but clearly are so for the distribution of consumption. The heterogeneity is evident in Figure 3 where the association between judicial accountability is clearly zero for the top income quintile, but strongly increasing over time for the top consumption quintile.
While the estimates in
So while we cannot claim that the full estimates of corruptionthe pure estimate of corruption plus the interaction effector that the full estimates of judicial accountability can be thought of as causal, we can still make causal claims. Because the time since the last major institutional change is exogenous to the quintile consumption shares, we can with statistical confidence say that the increases in the estimates that occur over the time since the last major institutional change causally affect the distribution of consumption. For example, the estimate of corruption of .008 on the bottom consumption quintile may or may not be causal, but the significant increase of an additional .004 after ten years can be interpreted as evidence of a causal effect of corruption.
Moreover, we are confident that the mechanisms through which this effect runs must be distinct from any mechanisms affecting the distribution of income. Because we include judicial accountability and find a similar pattern of heterogeneity in the estimates of judicial accountability, which appears somewhat stronger for the consumption distribution, we can be quite certain that the identified corruption effects do not merely reflect consequences of other parts of the institutional framework such as the quality of judicial institutions or the shape of political institutions, which would be captured by the inclusion of judicial accountability and democracy. Consistent with our theoretical considerations, we therefore find that institutional features not related to the control of corruption also affect the distribution of income and consumption in the longer runjudicial accountability also appears important (Dreher and Schneider, 2010; Bjørnskov, 2011) .
So far, the results show substantial support for equalizing effects of political corruption on consumption, and most likely that judicial accountability has the opposite effect. Yet, the option remains that these findings are specific to exploring quintile shares of the distribution of income and consumption, and that they overall findings are driven by specific countries or small groups of countries.
We therefore perform three sets of sensitivity analyses. We first re-estimate our main findings using two measures of the overall shape of the consumption distribution: Gini coefficients and the Theil index. We report the findings in Table A1 in the Appendix, using the full sample in columns 1 and 2 and the democratic subsample in columns 3 and 4.
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The overall findings are similar to those in Tables 2-4 with evidence for a Kuznets Curve, population effects and a positive association with the size of government. We also observe more evidence for the equalizing effects of coups and consequences of democratic political institutions. Most importantly, we can confirm a negative association between corruption and consumption inequality, with substantial evidence for heterogeneous effects of corruption and judicial accountability across the distribution of consumption. The strongly significant interaction terms in the lower panel of Table A1 show that the effects of corruption and judicial accountability are increasing in institutional stability, and a comparison between estimates using the full sample and the democratic subsample provide clear indications that these effects are stronger in democratic societies. Our main findings therefore do not appear to be specific to a particular way of measuring consumption inequality.
Second, we have performed two jackknife exercises to investigate whether there are particular regions in the world that drive the results and whether they can be associated with particular decades. The regions that we included are the West, South East Asia, the rest of Asia, North Africa and the Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, and the Pacific. The results, reported in Table A2 in Finally, a further worry could be that some of our findings are driven by observations that are interpolated in the GCIP dataset. We deal with this problem in Table A3 in the Appendix, where we delete all obviously interpolated data, which we identify when income or consumption shares do not change at all from year to year, or if the changes perfectly follow a linear change (i.e., a linear interpolation) between years. As is evident in the table, this final test reaffirms our main findings for corruption (the bottom quintile) and judicial accountability (the top quintile). On this basis, we conclude that the main results are statistically robust, and also that the size of the estimates appear relatively stable across tests.
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CONCLUDING REMARKS
In our desire to pinpoint how corruption and judicial accountability affect inequality, we have looked at a large cross-country sample for over more than half a century. Perhaps surprisingly, our results reveal that corruption is related to both income and consumption inequality in a negative way and that judicial accountability is related to these inequality indicators in a positive way. This suggests that the relative position of economic elites worsens with corruption, which in turn indicates either that other parts of the income and consumption distributions are better able to take advantage of corruption, e.g., by evading regulations, or that the elites, either consciously or unconsciously, use their de facto power to favor others more than themselves (perhaps in a preemptive way to retain power).
Conversely, judicial quality appears to protect the consumption shares of the economic elite, indicating that having accountable judiciaries may serve to fossilize an unequal distribution of consumption in society.
For average effects of corruption or judicial accountability we cannot claim any causal inference. However, we follow recent studies in establishing causality by exploring effect heterogeneity. Interacting corruption and judicial accountability with the time since the last major change in political institutions allows us to test a version of Olson's institutional sclerosis thesis, which also allows us to draw partial causal inference. Assuming that the time since the last major change is exogenous to inequalityan assumption that we cannot test but which the available data, as shown in Figure A1 in the Appendix, strongly indicatewe find that the effects of corruption and judicial accountability are increasing in this factor for consumption inequality. In other words, we observe that corruption contributes to a more equal distribution of consumption and that judicial accountability contributes to a less equal distribution the longer the political institutions have been stable. These implications are independent of the specific way we measure inequality and is valid across time, regions and the specific way we measure inequality.
We see this study as a contribution to the literature on the consequences of corruption and institutional quality, and it also sheds new light on the determinants of inequality. It suggests that although corruption may violate norms of just conduct and give rise to other detrimental outcomes, it need not necessarily worsen inequalities in society. Moreover, judicial quality, despite its positive connotations, may indeed do the opposite. These findings 23 seem to us important to take into careful account when considering policy measures that try to combat corruption and strengthen judicial accountability: possible side effects along distributional margins may need to be counteracted in a conscious way.
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